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BOOK REVIEW
A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH. Edited by
David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr.: University Press of
AMBIVALENT LEGACY:

Mississippi, 1984. Pp. x, 266.
Reviewed by Herbert A. Johnson*
This volume of essays generated by a February 1983 conference at the University of Southern Mississippi represents a major
step in the advancement of the legal history of the South.' Not
only does the collection raise challenging questions concerning the
history of law in the South, but it also presents outstanding examples of what can be accomplished when legal historians turn their
attention to this region and the states that comprise it. Covering a

broad geographical and topical range in individualistic fashion, the
essays are, for the most part, well researched and written with clarity and style. This Review will address each of the four categories
of essays chosen by the editors in structuring the work.
I.

LAW AND SOUTHERN HISTORY

A wide-ranging essay by the editors Bodenhamer and Ely
presents a survey of the historical scholarship that supports the
concept of a unique Southern history and thus justifies a study of
"Southern legal history." According to Bodenhamer and Ely, the
existence of slavery and a racial caste system in the antebellum
South 2 creates unique dimensions in Southern legal history. A
novel form of agrarianism based upon slave labor and the planta*Professor of History and Law, University of South Carolina. A.B. Columbia University, 1955; LL.B. New York Law School, 1960; M.A. Columbia University, 1961; Ph.D. Columbia University, 1965.
1. Earlier anthologies include a collection of papers from a conference at Vanderbilt
University School of Law in 1978, published in 32 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1979), and SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL HISTORY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE REYNOLDS CONFERENCE (H. Johnson ed. 1980).
2. Ely & Bodenhamer, Regionalism and the Legal History of the South, in AMBIVA-

A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 3-29 (D. Bodenhamer & J. Ely, Jr. eds. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as AMBIVALENT LEGACY].
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tion system inhibited commercial development in the early years of
the Republic and imposed stability upon family life through nonrecognition of divorce and sluggish recognition of married women's
property rights.
Although many legal historians have viewed Southern courts
and judges as supporters of the status quo, Bodenhamer and Ely
suggest that more extensive biographical and jurisprudential study
may well weaken this consensus.3 Their call for revision also extends to the traditional historical view of Southern crime and violence. Bodenhamer and Ely point to evidence that even in slave
trials Southern courts were more sensitive to demands for due process than previously has been thought. Furthermore, what has
been viewed as typical Southern inefficiency in law enforcement
actually may be a more widespread early American phenomenon.
The editors demonstrate that Southern attitudes toward crime and
its prosecution, which became much less tolerant with the years of
Civil War and Reconstruction, imply that some anachronism exist
in current views of antebellum Southern crime and violence. On
balance, however, Bodenhamer and Ely accept the regional characterization of the South and urge that the legal history of the South
become a major focus of scholarly attention.
As a counterpoint, Lawrence M. Friedman posits the intriguing argument that Southern culture, if it ever did exist as a regional variant of American civilization, has so converged with gen5
eral American culture that the two have become indistinguishable.
In the legal profession, he notes that "the South" may very well be
the construct of condescending Northern attitudes that tend to
overlook Southern contributions to jurisprudence. Indeed, Friedman implies that "the South" may have existed more strongly in
the minds of Northern viewers than it did in the lives of those who
actually resided in the South. Friedman sees the study of Southern
legal history as a useful and necessary adjunct to similar studies of
other regions, but his thesis rings clear-one must be wary of glib
regional stereotypes and facile, but flawed, theories of causality in
writing a legal history of the South.'
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 20-22.
5. Friedman, The Law Between the States: Some Thoughts on Southern Legal History, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 30-46.
6. See, for example, his comment that "[d]ifferences among regions tended to be differences in timing, pace, and manner, not differences in fundamentals." Id. at 42. Friedman
has the advantage of having compiled the most extensive survey of nineteenth century
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Friedman's discussion and the detailed essays that follow suggest a third approach to regionalism that is not represented in this
collection. Although a national convergence in American culture
may have taken place,7 the existence of the federal system assures
a substantial amount of locality in American law. Regional or national constructs of legal history are of value, but they should be
built upon solid monographic work concerning the individual colonies and states. As Julius Goebel suggested four decades ago, one
must consider the unique legal history of each state in order to
avoid interpretative error." Within the Southern region, for example, colonial Virginia's court system was founded upon the county
court, while South Carolina's colonial courts were rigidly centralized until 1769. An attempt to introduce a county court system
into South Carolina between 1799 and 1815 failed miserably. Regionalism, therefore, does not insure compatability, at least when
one is studying legal history. As a result, scholars can study a legal
history of the South, but it is unwise to search for a unitary Southern legal history.

II.

LAW AND THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY

Three essays treat the role of law in the development of the
Southern economy from the 1830s to the early twentieth century.
Tony A. Freyer demonstrates that the law shaped business relations before the Civil War by favoring large planters with extensive
slave holdings and by ensuring their continued dominance in economic and political power. 9 Freyer theorizes that the formal and
informal techniques employed to ease the predicament of free
blacks and other debtors simply were methods to insure cohesiveness in society and lower class deference in politics. Personal relations typified Southern commerce, according to Freyer, and resulted in a great dependence upon the unlimited liability of
partners in mercantile firms and the meager use of the corporate
entity. 10
American law in his A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973). Therefore, his comments on regionalism are particularly apt.
7. Friedman suggests a convergence of Southern culture into American culture. Friedman, The Law Between the States: Some Thoughts on Southern Legal History, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 43.
8. J. GOEBEL, JR. & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK:
STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) xxiv, xxx-xxxi, xxxv (1944).

A

9. Freyer, Law and the Antebellum Southern Economy: An Interpretation,in AMBivsupra note 2, at 49-68.
10. Id. at 55-58.
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Carrying forward the chronological history, Harry N.
Scheiber's essay concentrates on the postbellum years and provides
a picture of a South beleaguered by Northern economic imperialism and utilizing the remnants of states' rights to fight off Northern creditors." The exercise of diversity jurisdiction by federal
courts and the activities of equitable receivers in bankruptcy appointed by those tribunals became onerous reminders of Northern
economic dominance. Scheiber points out, however, that Southern
political and business leaders could have done much more to lift
Southern economic life from the stagnation that characterized it in
the late nineteenth century. Southern sources have misled historians who have accepted the claim that the South's poor economic
condition was due solely to Northern exploitation. To the contrary,
Scheiber concludes that federalism in the late nineteenth century
left ample room for the Southern states to take a more positive
course. Lack of political will, not Northern exploitation, caused ec12
onomic depression in the South.
The final essay in this group, by John V. Orth, also suggests
that the Southern states enjoyed economic freedom but used it irresponsibly.' Orth's essay, an in depth study of Virginia's repudiation of her pre-War and post-War debt, describes the convoluted
struggle between the Commonwealth of Virginia and her creditors
between 1870 and 1920. In addition to providing an excellent view
of state bond issuance in the reconstructed South, Orth demonstrates the extent to which the United States Supreme Court permitted the states to repudiate their bonded indebtedness. 14 Although Virginia's debt experience was different from that of other
Southern states, 5 this difference should not deter legal historians
from a more complete investigation of the economic aspects of lax
constitutional law enforcement in the "Gilded Age."
11. Scheiber, Federalism, the Southern Regional Economy, and Public Policy Since
1865, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 69-105.

12. Id. at 86. Scheiber, however, is quick to point out that the New Deal conferred
substantial advantages on the South, which now benefits greatly from the federal system. Id.
at 92-97.
13. Orth, The Virginia State Debt and the Judicial Power of the United States, in
AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 106-22.
14. Orth indicates that the Supreme Court revived state sovereignty based upon new
interpretations of the eleventh amendment. Virginia, however, had foregone protections she
might otherwise have claimed because she made the interest on her bonded indebtedness
acceptable in payment of taxes. The federal courts, therefore, did not have to enforce payment; Virginia bondholders could tender their coupons and wait to be sued for nonpayment
of taxes. Id. at 116.
15. See supra note 14.
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Taken as a whole, these essays demonstrate the rich lode of
new viewpoints available to historians who explore the causal relationships between law and economics. Attention to Southern law
must address the region's interrelated dependence upon agriculture and the institution of slavery. As Lawrence Friedman 6 points
out, however, studying the South will give us a new perspective on
the national scene. 17 Additionally, although legal scholars have
studied law and economics in the post-War South for several years,
they certainly would profit by applying these techniques directly to
the history of law in all of the United States.
III. LAW

AND RACE IN SOUTHERN HISTORY

The three essays in this section present the most controversial,
and regrettably, the most uneven portion of the collection. Philip
J. Schwarz addresses the difficult task of assessing the factors that
shaped Virginia's criminal code for slaves.' Schwarz points out
that the attitudes and behavior of both slaves and their masters
molded the Virginia slave code. Slave crime was "either politically
motivated or had a political impact,"' 9 and thus, to a large degree,
slaves were punished for their responses to oppressive control by
the white establishment. Noting the heavy predominance of theft
by slaves, Schwarz insists that this was a mark of resistance to
white authority. Schwarz also points to the growing severity of the
slave code in the years immediately preceding the Civil War. Unquestionably, patterns of slave behavior that challenged the existing order of law and plantation discipline would generate harsh
responses in the punitive law. In the absence of more convincing
evidence, however, the conclusion that the behavior itself was a
mark of political protest is difficult to accept. As Schwarz himself
is willing to admit, a slave's attack upon his master might be
caused by anger, by an attempt to gain freedom, or by vengeance.
To view such an attack as a death-defying political statement
seems dubious. At the very least, Schwarz' interpretation needs a
stronger psychological and evidentiary basis.2 0
16. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
17. Friedman, The Law Between the States: Some Thoughts on Southern Legal History, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 33.
18. Schwarz, Forgingthe Shackles: The Development of Virginia's Criminal Code for

Slaves, in
19.
20.

AMBIVALENT LEGACY,

supra note 2, at 125-46.

Id. at 127.
Schwarz' analysis harks back to the dated but pioneering work of Herbert

Aptheker. H.

APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS

(1943). A much more satisfactory
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Thomas D. Morris' essay on the chattel mortgage of slaves is a
much more convincing piece of historical scholarship. 21 Tracing the
development of the law of chattel mortgages and conditional sales,
Morris shows the extent to which Southern judges vacillated between a commercial view of this form of security and a paternalistic and humane application of equitable principles. His discussion
indicates that the conflict between growing commercial emphasis
upon private property and liberty of contract on the one hand, and
the traditional doctrines of just bargain and fair price on the other
perplexed nineteenth century judges.2 2 Morris also shows the great
effect that slavery had upon the development of Southern law in
the area of secured transactions. He provides, therefore, a starting
point for a comparative study of chattel mortgages and conditional
sales contracts in other regions less influenced by slavery. The
completion of such a parallel study would greatly enhance our understanding of the concept of private property in nineteenth century America.
Moving from slavery to the school desegregation activities of
the NAACP, Mark V. Tushnet's essay discusses not race but litigation strategy.23 Tushnet provides a careful and precise analysis of
the conflicting pressures on the NAACP as it altered its strategy in
the 1950s and began a program of litigation designed to end segregation in American elementary and secondary schools. Tushnet
also provides one of the best descriptions available of the policy
decisions antecedent to Brown v. Board of Education.4 He goes on
to suggest, however, that the NAACP lawyers should have abandoned individualistic arguments and stressed the "communitarian"
goal of the need to strengthen the black community. 25 This historical hindsight does little to enhance his analysis, and it unnecessarily criticizes Thurgood Marshall and Charles Hamilton Houston
for not embracing in the 1950s the convoluted logic of contempoand plausible Marxist interpretation of the dynamics of slavery is that of Eugene Genovese.
E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974).
21. Morris, "Society Is Not Marked by Punctuality in the Payment of Debts": The
Chattel Mortgages of Slaves, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 147-70.
22. Data provided by Morris challenges the broad and generalized conclusions of Morton Horwitz concerning the formalism in nineteenth century American business law. Id. at
164; M. HoRwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 266 (1977).
23. Tushnet, Organizing Civil Rights Litigation: The NAACP's Experience, in AMBiVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 171-84.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Tushnet, Organizing Civil Rights Litigation: The NAACP's Experience, in AmBivALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 179-81.
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rary "affirmative action" and "positive discrimination" jurisprudence. Lawyers design their strategies foremost to win cases, not to
spin out innovative legal doctrine. Historians do not benefit the
study of legal history by such second guessing of past generations.
IV.

SOUTHERN COURTS, BENCH, AND BAR

This section on the institutional structure of law-its courts,
judges, and the bar-touches on the more traditional areas of legal
history in innovative ways. Peter C. Hoffer, fresh from editing the
criminal court records of colonial Richmond County, Virginia,
poses the interesting question of why this rural county had a
higher crime rate than colonial cities with a much more heterogenous population.2 6 Examining the incidence of slave crime, Hoffer
notes that black slaves in Richmond County commonly were accused of thefts of necessity (food and clothing) and rarely of rebellion. 7 In addition, county leaders attributed the bulk of criminal
activity in Virginia's Richmond County to free laborers, servants,
and poor freeholders who had committed crimes and misdemeanors in the other colonies. The presence of a large number of slaves
and the fear that they and poor free laborers would commit crime
are, in Hoffer's opinion, the reasons why the authorities were so
diligent in ferreting out and prosecuting criminal offenses. The result of this diligence, according to Hoffer, was a sharply elevated
rate of indictments and other prosecutions.
Turning to the lack of jury trials in the Richmond County
criminal trial records, Hoffer questions the view that the military
origin of early Virginia law made colonists reluctant to resort to
jury trial. 28 He sees this waiver of jury trial rather as an effort on
the part of accused persons to maintain their position within the
county. With few institutions available in colonial Virginia for social control, the county justices were almost as concerned that the
accused simply submit to the justices' authority as they were with
the outcome of the case. Accordingly, asserts Hoffer, the justices
afforded lenient treatment to those who quietly submitted to the
courts' authority, and only a handful of accused were willing to
risk offending the county justices or the local grand juries by chal26. Hoffer, Disorder and Deference: The Paradoxes of Criminal Justice in the Colonial Tidewater, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 187-201.
27. Cf. supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (Schwarz suggests that slave crime
was often "politically motivated").
28. Hoffer, Disorder and Deference: The Paradoxof Criminal Justice in the Colonial
Tidewater, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 186-99.
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lenging their decisions before a petit jury. This explanation is plausible, but so is the theory advanced earlier in this collection of essays by Lawrence Friedman: trial was a much less complex matter
in a legal system that was dominated by lay judges and juries, and
these lay courts reserved full due process treatment for only the
most significant offenses. 9
A.G. Roeber's study of German emigrants to colonial Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania examines the degree to which
past experience with informal resolution of disputes in Germany,
coupled with a Lutheran antipathy to secular law and the legal
profession, kept Germans from positions at the bar and on the
bench.3 0 Among Germans, only the Moravians of North Carolina
appear to have exerted pressure for representation on the local
county courts. The royal government considered Moravian jurists
to be particularly loyal at a time when most German settlers were
found in the ranks of the Regulator movement. Roeber's carefully
researched and well-reasoned essay brings the techniques of ethnic
history and prosopography to bear upon the legal profession. In so
doing the essay provides a very useful viewpoint concerning variant attitudes toward courts and law held by settlers of foreign
background or of unique religious belief. Like any study of its
length, Roeber's essay raises a number of questions for future research. 3 ' The essay also suggests that the legal profession in each
jurisdiction must be studied carefully for its representative character and its religious and ethnic composition.
A good example of such a work is Kermit L. Hall's essay on
the effect of the introduction of judicial election on the judicial
personnel of the Southern states. 2 Hall concludes that members of
the Southern judiciary, in general, were not substantially different
from their Northern counterparts; they did, however, exhibit provincialism in their higher education and legal training because
29. Friedman, The Law Between the States: Some Thoughts on Southern Legal History, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 36-38.
30. Roeber, "He read it to me from a book of English law" Germans, Bench, and Bar
in the Colonial South, 1715-1770, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 202-28.
31. The essay describes German attempts to isolate themselves and colonial courts. It
would be helpful to know whether in areas in which individual initiative was determinative,
(such as in drafting wills, negotiating contracts, apportioning family lands), German customs prevailed. How did English-oriented courts deal with German customs; were they received into local law to support deviant commercial practices, to serve as evidence of unusual property dispostions, or to mitigate offenses known to English but not to German law?
32. Hall, The "Route to Hell" Retraced: The Impact of Popular Election on the
Southern Appellate Judiciary,1832-1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 2, at 229-55.
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most did not leave the South for these purposes. Although more
Southern judges tended to fit into familial patterns of judicial "office-holding" than did Midwestern judges, this is attributable more
to the decline of the two party system in the Restoration South
than to the advent of judicial election.
V.

CONCLUSION

This extremely worthwhile collection of essays will provide
good reading for students of Southern history and for all who have
an interest in the history of American law. Ambivalent Legacy succeeds admirably in directing attention to the growing volume of
work on legal history of the South and in providing a good working
bibliography on law in the Southern states. Bodenhamer and Ely
are to be commended for convening the meeting that generated
these essays and for their selection of the scholars to participate in
the endeavor.

